This article investigates the relationship between emotional sharing and the extended mind thesis. We argue that shared emotions are socially extended emotions that involve a specific type of constitutive integration between the participating individuals’ emotional experiences. We start by distinguishing two claims, the Environmentally Extended Emotion Thesis and the Socially Extended Emotion Thesis. We then critically discuss some recent influential proposals about the nature of shared emotions. Finally, in Sect. 3, we motivate two conditions that an account of shared emotions (...) ought to accommodate: Reciprocal Other-awareness and Integration. Consideration of and discussion of relational accounts of joint attention lead us to the proposal that a construal of socially extended emotions in terms of a constitutive integration of the participating individuals’ experiences is more promising than proposals that simply appeal to various forms of social situatedness, embeddedness, or scaffolding. (shrink)

This volume bridges this longstanding divide by demonstrating how rigorous experimental methods can be applied to understanding key existential concerns, ...

This topically organized, interdisciplinary anthology provides competing perspective on the claim that western culture faces a moral crisis. Using clearly written, accessible essays by well-known authors in philosophy, the social sciences, and the humanities, the book introduces students to a variety of perspectives on the current cultural debate about values that percolates beneath the surface of most of our social and political controversies.

Hegel introduced the Phenomenology of Mind as a work on the problem of knowledge. In the first chapter, entitled “Sense Certainty, or the This and Meaning,” he concluded that knowledge cannot consist of an immediate awareness of particulars ). The tradition discusses sense certainty in terms of this failure of immediate knowledge without, however, specifically addressing the problem of reference. Yet reference is distinct from knowledge in the sense that while there can be no knowledge of objects without reference, there (...) may be reference without knowledge. If that is the case, then the failure of immediate knowledge does not entitle us to conclude anything about the success or failure of reference. It is not surprising, then, that a few scholars have begun to examine sense certainty primarily as a thesis about reference. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes é um dos fundadores da moderna concepção de poder político.A instituição do Estado tem no pensador inglês,uma de suas vertentes racionais.O trabalho examina as raízes jusnaturalistas do teórico político ingles e assume a posição de que o legado hobbesiano não é dialetizável. .

Within the paradigm of political liberalism, Hobbes’s legal philosophy has the peculiarity that individual property rights are treated as conditional and derived from the State’s absolute property rights, and thus common, State and individual property are explicitly recognised as three different juridical realities. Through determining the place that Hobbes’s few references to common property hold within his legal philosophy, it is possible to turn the thought of this classic author into a very useful theoretical tool for thinking the possibilities and (...) limits of a political strategy betting for common property against State property. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas seems to suggest, though implicitly, that in their ethical conduct the majority of women is much more conditioned by the movements of the stars than men. Although he frequently maintains that the stars solely move the body of all human beings (men and women alike), not the rational powers of their souls, they may have an impact on the human soul indirectly and occasionally ( indirecte et occasionaliter ). Only a few, to wit, the wise (i.e., those (...) who exercise reason properly and are able to govern righteously) are independent of the influence of the celestial bodies. Even if women and men are both the image of God according to Aquinas, from an Aristotelian perspective, the female is considered a 'deficient man' ( mas occasionatus ). Therefore, the physical and psychic constitution of women is in principle much more susceptible to be governed by passions, and thus to be subject to a form of astral determinism. This, I argue, may compromise the freedom of choice and moral responsibility of most women. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Konstantin VII. Porphyrogennetos hatte neben seinem bekannten Sohn Romanos (dem späteren Kaiser Romanos II.) noch einen weiteren Sohn namens Leon. Dieser Leon erblickte um 939 das Licht der Welt. Es ist möglich und sogar wahrscheinlich, läßt sich aber nicht mit absoluter Sicherheit sagen, ob er der ältere und damit erstgeborene der beiden Brüder war. Der Altersunterschied der beiden Brüder war jedenfalls nicht allzu groß. Aus einem Brief ihres Vaters geht hervor, daß beide Brüder in ihrer frühen Kindheit (...) anscheinend relativ schwer erkrankt waren. Es ist möglich, aber doch eher unwahrscheinlich, daß gerade diese, in dem Brief erwähnte Erkrankung zum Tode Leons führte. Leon war möglicherweise noch gegen Ende der Herrschaft des Kaisers Romanos I. Lakapenos, im Jahre 944 am Leben. Er starb aber vermutlich in diesem Jahr oder zu Beginn des nächsten Jahres. Am 6. April 945, zum Zeitpunkt der Mitkaiserkrönung seines Bruders Romanos, weilte er jedenfalls nicht mehr unter den Lebenden. Es ist möglich, aber nicht zu beweisen, daß er in dem im Zeremonienbuch erwähnten kleinen Larnakion im Heroon Konstantins des Großen in der Apostelkirche zu Konstantinopel, der Begräbnisstätte seiner Familie, beigesetzt war. (shrink)

In 2014, American doctor Ian Crozier chose to travel to Sierra Leone to help fight the West African Ebola epidemic. He contracted Ebola himself and was evacuated to the US, where he received hospital treatment for 40 days. Crozier knowingly chose to expose himself to a risk of contracting Ebola, and thus appears to be at least somewhat morally responsible for his infection. Did this responsibility weaken his justice-based claim to publicly funded treatment? On one influential view—luck egalitarianism—the answer is (...) ‘yes’. Or so Albertsen and Thaysen suggest in this issue.1 According to luck egalitarianism, justice requires the elimination of inequalities between people, but only when the relative harm borne by those on the wrong end of the inequality is a matter of luck. Albertsen and Thaysen understand luck egalitarianism to entail that, when one is responsible for befalling a harm, one has no claim in justice to the mitigation of that harm. On this view, they suggest, Crozier’s claim to treatment would be similar to that of a reckless Alpine skier who is injured in a skiing accident, and would be weaker than that of those with a normal claim to treatment—those who bear no responsibility for their illness. Both of these implications seem implausible, however. Intuitively, Crozier’s claim to treatment is no weaker than those with normal claims, and certainly stronger than the reckless skier’s. Can luck egalitarianism be ‘adjusted or interpreted’ so as to avoid these implausible implications? The authors suggest that it can. Their innovation is to distinguish heroic doctors like Crozier from reckless skiers by invoking a distinction between being responsible for creating harm and for incurring harm. Their thought is that one creates harm when one brings harm on oneself without also preventing at least as much harm to others. Thus, the harm that …. (shrink)

Since Pope Leo XIII wrote Rerum Novarum, the Catholic Church, while opposing socialism, has adopted a skeptical and suspicious posture with regard to the free market. The popes have supported labor unions, the idea of a "just wage," and a variety of other interventions. Yet the economic recommendations of the Church have consistently proven counterproductive, and have apparently been devised without recourse to economic law. Papal economic teaching is filled with unstated assumptions which, if false, throw into question the moral (...) analysis based on them.Depuis que le Pape Léon XIII a écrit Rerum Novarum l’église catholique, bien qu’opposée au socialisme, a adopté une attitude sceptique et suspicieuse à l’égard du libre marché. Les papes successifs ont soutenu les syndicats, l’idée de « juste salaire », et une variété d’autres interventions. Jusqu’à présent les recommandations économiques de l’Eglise ont constamment été contreproductives et ont été promulguées sans égard vis-à-vis des lois économiques. L’enseignement économique des Papes est rempli d’hypothèses non formulées qui, si elles sont fausses, mettent en question l’analyse morale qu’elles sous-tendent. (shrink)

How should we interpret the declaration in I John 4:8 and 16 that God not only loves, but is love? Many philosophically trained Christians will no doubt interpret this, as I do, to mean that love is part of God's very essence; that loving kindness is an essential, not merely an accidental, property of God. Of course the author of I John was not a philosopher and did not, fortunately, employ philosophical jargon in his writings; nor was he likely even (...) familiar with the philosophical distinction between essential and accidental properties. He nonetheless seems clearly to employ "God" as a proper name (as opposed to a title), the name of a distinct person whom we ought to adore and worship, and he says concerning this person that he is love. The point, then, hardly seems to be that the person who is God just happens to love us, as if it were a happy accident that he does; the point seems to be that it is his very nature to love us. In a broadly logical (or metaphysical) sense, it couldn't have been otherwise.1 That this is, at the very least, a natural interpretation seems indisputable. Commenting upon I John 4:8, the conservative New Testament scholar, Leon Morris, thus writes: God is love. This means more than `God is loving'. It means that God's essential nature is love. He loves, so to speak, not because he finds objects worthy of His love, but because it is His nature to love. His love for us depends not on what we are, but on what He is. He loves us because He is that kind of God. (shrink)

Over the course of the last four decades, William Leon McBride has distinguished himself as one of the most esteemed and accomplished philosophers of his generation. This volume—which celebrates the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday—includes contributions from colleagues, friends, and formers students and pays tribute to McBride’s considerable achievements as a teacher, mentor, and scholar.

On a widely held characterization, triadic joint attention is the capacity to perceptually attend to an object or event together with another subject. In the last four decades, research in developmental psychology has provided increasing evidence of the crucial role that this capacity plays in socio-cognitive development, early language acquisition, and the development of perspective-taking. Yet, there is a striking discrepancy between the general agreement that joint attention is critical in various domains, and the lack of theoretical consensus on how (...) to account for it. This paper pursues three interrelated aims: (i) it examines the contrast between reductive and non-reductive views of (triadic) joint attention, by bringing into focus the notion of recursive mindreading; (ii) it assembles, advances, and discusses a number of arguments against reductive views; (iii) finally, in dialogue with some prominent non-reductive views, it outlines the case for a non-reductive view that gives pride of place to the idea that co-attenders relate to one another as a ‘you’. (shrink)

Many philosophers nowadays believe Frege was right about belief, but wrong about language: The contents of beliefs need to be individuated more finely than in terms of Russellian propositions, but the contents of utterances do not. I argue that this 'hybrid view' cannot offer no reasonable account of how communication transfers knowledge from one speaker to another and that, to do so, we must insist that understanding depends upon more than just getting the references of terms right.

We are walking too quickly down the road to physical and psychological utopia without pausing to assess the potential damage to our humanity from this brave new ...

The book begins with an overview that introduces the Theorem and the issues surrounding it, and explores how the essays that follow contribute to our understanding of those issues.

This paper discusses Frege's account of definition by induction in Grundgesetze and the two key theorems Frege proves using it.

In Mind and World, John McDowell argues against the view that perceptual representation is non-conceptual. The central worry is that this view cannot offer any reasonable account of how perception bears rationally upon belief. I argue that this worry, though sensible, can be met, if we are clear that perceptual representation is, though non-conceptual, still in some sense 'assertoric': Perception, like belief, represents things as being thus and so.

As is well-known, the formal system in which Frege works in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent, Russell’s Paradox being derivable in it.This system is, except for minor differ...

This paper is concerned with neo-Fregean accounts of reference to abstract objects. It develops an objection to the most familiar such accounts, due to Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, based upon what I call the 'proliferation problem': Hale and Wright's account makes reference to abstract objects seem too easy, as is shown by the fact that any equivalence relation seems as good as any other. The paper then develops a response to this objection, and offers an account of what it (...) is for abstracta to exist that is Fregean in spirit but more robust than familiar views. (shrink)

An investigation of Frege’s various contributions to the study of language, focusing on three of his most famous doctrines: that concepts are unsaturated, that sentences refer to truth-values, and that sense must be distinguished from reference.

This paper explores the relationship between Hume's Prinicple and Basic Law V, investigating the question whether we really do need to suppose that, already in Die Grundlagen, Frege intended that HP should be justified by its derivation from Law V.

Volume I provides a detailed analysis of cylindric algebras, starting with a formulation of their axioms and a development of their elementary properties, and proceeding to a deeper study of their interrelationships by means of general algebraic notions such as subalgebras, homomorphisms, direct products, free algebras, reducts and relativized algebras.

Modes of Presentation analyses a collection of problems, known as 'Frege's puzzle', resulting from how thinkers and speakers have a limited perspective on reference in thought and language. Heck argues that these puzzles have much to teach us both about the foundations of cognition and the nature of linguistic communication.